Development of the 'Water-specific P3 risk model': risks identified. by Korayem, I.M. et al.
 
 
 
 
OpenAIR@RGU 
 
The Open Access Institutional Repository 
at Robert Gordon University 
 
http://openair.rgu.ac.uk 
 
This is the accepted version of a paper originally published by the 
International Council for Research and Innovation in Building and 
Construction (CIB) in  
 
Proceedings of CIB2015: “Going North for sustainability”: leveraging 
knowledge and innovation for sustainable and development, 23-25 
November 2015, London, UK. 
 
 
Citation Details 
 
Citation for the version of the work held in ‘OpenAIR@RGU’: 
 
KORAYEM, M.I., OGUNLANA, O.S. and BOATENG, P. 2015. 
Development of the “Water-specific P3 risk model”: risks 
identified. In Proceedings of CIB2015: “Going North for 
sustainability”: leveraging knowledge and innovation for 
sustainable and development, 23-25 November 2015, London, UK. 
Available from OpenAIR@RGU. [online]. Available from: 
http://openair.rgu.ac.uk 
 
 
Citation for the publisher’s version: 
 
KORAYEM, M.I., OGUNLANA, O.S. and BOATENG, P. 2015. 
Development of the “Water-specific P3 risk model”: risks 
identified. In Proceedings of CIB2015: “Going North for 
sustainability”: leveraging knowledge and innovation for 
sustainable and development, 23-25 November 2015, London, UK. 
 
Copyright 
 
Items in ‘OpenAIR@RGU’, Robert Gordon University Open Access Institutional Repository, 
are protected by copyright and intellectual property law. If you believe that any material 
held in ‘OpenAIR@RGU’ infringes copyright, please contact openair-help@rgu.ac.uk with 
details. The item will be removed from the repository while the claim is investigated. 
  
 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE “WATER-SPECIFIC P3 
RISK MODEL”, RISKS IDENTIFIED 
 
 
 
Korayem M.I
1
, Ogunlana O.S
1
, Boateng P
2
 
 
 
 
 
1
 School of the Built Environment, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, Scotland, 
EH14 4AS, UK 
 
2
 Scott Sutherland School of Architecture and Built Environment, Robert Gordon 
University, Aberdeen, AB10 7QB, Scotland, UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AUTHOR’S COPY – 
 
 
 
Korayem M.I, Ogunlana O.S, Boateng P. (2015)  Development of the “Water-
Specific P3 Risk Model”, Risks Identified.  CIB 2015: “GOING NORTH FOR 
SUSTAINABILITY” 23rd – 25th November 2015, London South Bank University, 
London, UK 
 
 
 
2015 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE “WATER-SPECIFIC P3 RISK MODEL”,  
RISKS IDENTIFIED 
 
2 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE “WATER-SPECIFIC P3 RISK 
MODEL”, RISKS IDENTIFIED 
 
 
Korayem M.I
1
, Ogunlana O.S
1
, Boateng P
2 
 
1 School of the Built Environment, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, Scotland, EH14 4AS, UK 
2 Scott Sutherland School of Architecture and Built Environment, Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen, AB10 
7QB, Scotland, UK
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Risk assessment is one of the key success factors of public-private partnerships (PPP) 
water projects. Factors such as utility condition problems, unsustained increase in water 
supply requirements, socio-technical issues and changes in government policies can cause 
such capital intensive projects to overrun planned budget and schedule allocations. Where 
the project is a commercial asset, delayed completion time and cost overruns usually have 
significant impact on the profitability of the project as well as the estimated returns on 
investment over the operational phase of the project. Understanding the specific risks 
involved in PPP water projects can be very crucial in designing containment measures to 
deal with their likely impact on the projects. Through review of literature and non-
participant observation, different risk factors in PPP water projects can be identified. The 
identified factors can then be rated and prioritised through questionnaires using the 
Analytical Network Process (ANP) to demonstrate the complex interactions among those 
risks and to establish the most salient Value-for-Money (VFM) variables on PPP water 
projects. The outcome of the proposed research is an innovative ANP-based model 
known as “Water-Specific P3 Risk Model” that offers a platform to incorporate tangible 
and intangible risk variables into a risk assessment process in water infrastructure 
projects.  
 
This paper presents the overall research methodology and the literature review undertaken 
for the identification of the risk factors associated with Water PPP Projects.  Subsequent 
stages of the research is currently under progress. 
 
Keywords: Public-Private Partnerships, Water Infrastructure, PPP Water Projects, Risk 
Assessment, Value for Money, Analytic Network Process. 
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BACKGROUND 
In the early 1990s, market-driven approaches for water resources management started to 
gain acceptance.  Water was recognized as an economic good i.e. a commodity that 
should be priced at its cost of provision and its true value to society (Ouyahia, 2006).  For 
developed countries, the United Nations in its 2000 Millennium Declaration, set eight 
goals for development, called the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These goals 
set an ambitious agenda for improving the human condition by 2015.  In support of these 
goals, the Millennium Project was launched to recommend the best strategies for 
achieving the MDGs. Privatization and decentralization have become the main reform 
policies of the major international organizations (World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).  Public-Private 
Partnerships (abbreviated as PPP, or P3) have been introduced as the most common 
scheme of project development.  
 
The involvement of the private sector in water infrastructure projects is a subject of much 
debate, which is currently far from being settled.  Statistically, water projects undertaken 
under private sector are experiencing cancellation/distress at a much higher rate than 
other infrastructure projects under the same procurement scheme.  Both proponents and 
opponents of water privatization support their claims with figures that should strengthen 
each party’s argument. However, in lack of a common base of comparative analysis, 
these numbers were not indicative and could be considered as outliers.   
 
The case was clearly summarized by Karen Bakker (2010): 
“Most of the debate has centered on the relative merits of the public and private 
sector in managing large-scale reticulated water-supply networks.  Unbiased 
research is rare; an examination of comparative performance is often influenced by 
ideological commitments.  It is thus somewhat predictable that proponents and 
opponents of water privatization rarely agree on research strategies.” 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A research on Water PPP is not expected to conclude on the debate on this matter.  
However, a better understanding of the risks involved in water PPP projects can 
significantly assist in designing containment measures to deal with their likely impact on 
the projects. 
 
In order to achieve this aim, a research plan was set which comprises of identifying the 
risks associated with water PPP projects through the review of literature. The identified 
factors can then be rated and prioritized through questionnaires and non-participant 
observation utilizing the Analytical Network Process (ANP) to demonstrate the complex 
interactions among those risks and to establish the most salient Value-for-Money (VFM) 
variables on PPP water projects. The outcome of this research will be an innovative ANP-
based model known as “Water-Specific P3 Risk Model” that offers a platform to 
incorporate tangible and intangible risk variables into a risk assessment process in water 
infrastructure projects.  
 
CRITICAL REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This stage was considered necessary as a primary stage prior to identifying of risks in 
water PPP projects through a subsequent stage of literature review.  The aim of this 
primary stage was to better understand the ongoing debate on this matter, and for getting 
a comprehensive grasp of existing knowledge that would allow making an original 
contribution to knowledge in this research area as advised by Naoum (1998). The 
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research included investigating the various disciplines related to water infrastructure 
including construction, rehabilitation, asset management, and financing. 
 
Proponents and Opponents of Water Privatization 
Both proponents and opponents of water privatization supported their claims with figures 
that should strengthen each party’s argument.  A critical review of the most common 
assumptions/allegations made by each party is presented in this section. 
 
The proponents of water privatization have always linked the poor political condition in 
some countries to the deficiency in water supply management especially in third world 
countries.  This is a very general assumption, besides it ignores the fact that the same 
political bodies are responsible for engaging private sector parties in new water 
infrastructure projects.  Accordingly, the assumption that the mis-management of political 
parties of water resources would only change if we switch to engaging the private sector 
is invalid.  The assumption that private corporations will endeavour to lower their prices 
to gain more costumers is not always valid.  After a certain point, the increase in water 
supply may require additional resources (facilities, equipment, services, etc…) to 
maintain the same level of service, which will result in additional cost to the Private 
corporation. The claimed success of water PPP projects in some developed countries 
cannot be considered as a proof of the success of such schemes in every country, 
especially in developing countries with significantly different conditions. It only proves 
that a proper setup of such scheme is a necessity of such procurement model.  The 
assumption that poor people are ready to pay more for an improved service does not 
explain the social and political tension that water privatization face in first world 
countries like in Canada.   
 
On the operation side, the assumption that the engagement of private sector will action an 
immediate improvement to the service is not valid.  The fact is that water spillage from 
pipes are mostly attributed to aging infrastructure where available records of previous 
maintenance activities either does not exist or is not made available.  Even with the 
availability of such records, the rehabilitation/maintenance of water pipes is facing 
limited budgets allocated for maintenance. The engagement of private sector is not 
foreseen to change things dramatically in this regard. The assumption that private 
corporations will have more tendency to handle water with care is not always accurate 
given that the private sector is engaged in a pre-determined contract value over a certain 
period of time with a pre-agreed level of performance.  The increase of water supply may 
lead to more effort (and cost) to comply with the stakeholders’ requirements and maintain 
the same quality level.  Assuming that private sector will allow for more investment in 
research and development is not always accurate. A relatively large amount of research is 
taking place in developing improved strategies for water pipes maintenance and 
rehabilitation; however, governments mostly fund this research according to our 
observations. 
 
The assumption that users, under the free water-pricing model, will have the option to 
seek an alternative in case of improper service is clearly not valid given the monopolistic 
nature of the water sector.   Also, the assumption that private entities will seek an 
improvement to their service for an increased use and earnings is not always accurate.  
The additional use of resources can lead to more investments in facilities so as to handle 
such increase and maintain an acceptable operational/environmental level of service. 
The proponents typically ignored the necessity of developing a water policy based on 
available resources and target achievements with respect to water access and quality.  The 
arrangement and coordination of new proposed projects should follow such policy.  The 
allegation made that building major infrastructure facilities like dams is not always a 
necessity forms an unsubstantiated claim unless the associated engineering studies are 
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examined. The indication  by Segerfeldt (2005) that World Bank on investments on 
public works like building large dams have lead to many spectacular failures is very 
general, and is therefore is not acceptable.  Building dams, like any other engineering 
project, should have the typical engineering studies starting from preliminary design till 
detailed design to allow for a proper assessment, analysis, and execution.  Moreover, the 
reference by Segerfeldt (2005) to a major public works failure like in the Soviet Union 
that took place during the 1950s does not offer a scientifically acceptable basis for 
evaluation   (P21).  Linking a proper water policy to market-driven policies is not valid.  
In Chile, private ownership was introduced where landowners were given the right to 
own water and sell it at freely determined prices.  The success of such model in Chile 
does not necessarily guarantee that the same model is valid everywhere as engineering 
requirements beside political and social conditions should be studied well for each case.  
In any case, the overall planning of water supply is not expected to be handled by local 
residents but rather by responsible organizations. 
 
On the other side, the opponents have put most of their efforts opposing the concept.   
Brubaker (2011) considers that many municipal utilities are ill-equipped to deal with new 
challenges in the industry and lack the necessary expertise at all levels.   In-depth 
research on the matter is very limited.  The most notable effort towards a more rational 
assessment of the situation was conducted by Bakker (2010).  Bakker analysis came from 
a different starting point of the debate, through focusing on issues of governance,  where 
many are common between public and private parties. However, in our opinion, Bakker 
generally implied a shared responsibility between the public and private sectors for the 
current on-going deficiencies in this sector. As an example,  while the reported overall 
market share of private sector is around 3%, Bakker still note that the private sector is 
handling 20% of the market in urban areas with its current known deficiencies.  While 
this may be true, it ignores the fact that the majority of services at its current conditions is 
offered by the public sector with its currently known deficiencies. 
 
Declination of the Number of Water PPP Projects  
According to World Bank data, a severe drop in the number of water PPP projects has 
occurred.  The number of new projects with private participation that reached financial or 
contractual closure in 2009 declined by 46% compared to 2008.  Annual investment 
commitments fell by 31% within the same period (Refer to Figure 1 below).  Based on 
the Word Bank data, by 2009, the percentage of cancelled/distressed projects in water 
infrastructure forms 34% of the total committed investment, compared to 8% in 
electricity, 3% in telecom, and 8% in transport.  The subject is not well-addressed in the 
research as of the reasons for such drop.  In general, Ouyahia (2006) presented the water 
sector specific nature.  Several case studies of such failures have been presented but in 
our opinion, most of this work was driven by the ideological concepts of the authors, or at 
least limited to the cases in hand.  There is a need for an overall assessment of the 
situation where the reasons for such drop are assessed and delineated by industry experts 
to a list of risks associated with water sector. 
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Figure 1: Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects between 1990 and 2009 
Source: World Bank and PPIAF, PPP Database (2010) 
 
THE “WATER-SPECIFIC P3 RISK MODEL”, RISKS IDENTIFIED 
Considering the knowledge obtained from the primary stage of the literature review, the 
author conducted an extensive review of water PPP projects cancellation including 
studying several published case studies.  Presented in this section are the water-specific 
risks identified throughout this review which was found to be the common causes of 
cancellation of many water PPP projects. 
  
A. Absence of Facility Records 
Inadequate performance records for years in the past would prevent having meaningful 
comparisons between the public operator and its private successors. In Halifax, the 
disagreements between the public and private parties arose months after the initial 
agreement was signed.  The private party claimed that potential problems with influent 
quality came to light only when the federal government issued its environmental 
screening report for the project. Prior to that, it relied on out-of-date data provided by the 
city and by local industry. Halifax insisted that it provided ample opportunities for testing 
and that it would have been reasonable for the consortium to do due diligence. 
    
B. Asset Condition 
Asset Valuation: Obtaining solid information about the state of infrastructure is 
significant for a proper project evaluation and risk assessment of new investments.  A 
clear identification of the asset condition is a major technical challenge.  Besides, the lack 
of records of the previous activities relevant to existing systems is very common and does 
not make the issue any easier. Without such information, it difficult to establish a baseline 
to enable private firms to accurately bid on the work.  This has been constantly a source 
of disputes.  In the case of Atlanta, where some parts of its Infrastructure dates back to 
1875, the private partner “Suez” complained that the initial contract as it was signed did 
not reflect the actual status of the system.  The Reason Foundation explained, “Some of 
the blame must fall on UWSA (Public owner). All of the bidders knew about the lack or 
quality of data ahead of time before they bid. Furthermore, USWA has a lot of experience 
running old systems and it should have built that expertise into its proposal.”  In the case 
of Buenos Aires, the unexpected poor performance of the buried assets was one of the 
reasons that lead to project cancellation at the end.   In the case of Hamilton, the 
municipal staff confirmed that for the Contractor to meet the required performance 
standards, the system requires investment of hundreds of millions of dollars, which does 
not form part of the Contractor scope of work. The assessment of infrastructure 
conditions by requiring several competing firms to study a system extensively would be 
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inefficient. Producing numerous feasibility studies would push up the costs of the bids 
and, by making the bidding process too expensive for small firms and will reduce 
competition. The most basic valuation problem in valuing assets-in-place is the use of 
discounted cash flow (DCF) techniques (Hertz, 1964). Regardless of the individual 
strengths and limitations of the various valuation methods, a common deficiency is that 
there is no indication of the confidence level on the determined capitalization rates (Ye 
and Tiong, 2000). The Asian Development Bank guidelines (1999) provides 
recommended financial evaluation methodologies for water supply projects. 
 
Asset Management: Significant research has been conducted on the rehabilitation of 
distribution networks.  The traditional strategies for rehabilitation varies between: 
Operative, inspection, Condition based, Proactive, and Predictive (Ugarelli, 2008).  
Numerous numbers of models were developed to assist in developing a strategy that 
reduce leakage for improved operative costs and enhance the environmental records. 
However, without a solid knowledge of the asset condition, the assessment of the 
operation component becomes very hard. Gathering and documenting information about 
the system will entail some expenditure for sure, but this initial cost will help not just to 
reduce unwanted expenses in the future, but also enable a services provider to manage the 
asset better.  
C. Expansion Potential 
It is essential that the relevant major construction projects, in particular those for water 
production and transmission, are well identified during the preparation stage. Early (or 
late) expansion of the system may cause disturbance to the overall planning and may 
result in the Contractor’s inability to meet the contract requirements. The following 
factors typically cause the need for facility upgrade and/or expansion: 
 
Increase in Population: In Atlanta, the private partner inherited from the city a backlog 
of between 4,000 and 7,000 outstanding requests for service.  This was accompanied with 
a construction boom in the service area, which created additional demands that was not 
accounted for during bidding stage.  Additional investment to meet the increase in 
demand was not envisioned during the bidding process. 
Increase in Usage: In some cases, the improvement of service have encouraged more use 
in water while the company may not be prepared for investing on this direction.  In some 
cases, the contract is only set for providing service.  Inability to meet the stakeholders’ 
expectation can draw major negative political implications on the project. In some other 
cases, preventing the use of private wells led to an unexpected increase in usage. 
 
Improvement in Quality: The private operator is obliged to follow the minimum 
performance criteria set in the contract.  This may require replacement of inappropriate 
connections (which is considered as the most common source of physical leaks), which in 
some cases does not form part of the private sector scope of work.  Also, it may have not 
been foreseen as a consequence of years of limited or inappropriate data collection.  The 
timely implementation of such improvement has been a key factor in success.  If not 
considered in the original private sector planning, the process may be delayed causing 
problems in the project delivery.  In some instances, the involvement of a locally 
experienced Contractor have helped improved the process like in the case of Côte 
d’Ivoire (Martin, 2009).  SODECI, a governmental entity, has always been in charge of 
regular extensions of distribution networks which assisted when it became responsible for 
identifying and preparing the capital investment program.  
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D. External Impact 
Close coordination between the proposed project objectives and other inter-related 
projects is essential.  Disruption on the program may have negative implications on the 
PPP project, due to one (or more) of the following factors: 
 
A party not performing the promised investments: The delay in awarding (or 
completing) a relevant project may have a severe impact on the PPP project in hand.  The 
delay may result in the contractor not being able to meet the contract specifications in 
terms of production or in terms of meeting the contract specified environmental 
regulations.  The case of Manila is the most revealing, one of the reasons that led to the 
cancellation of the project was the government inability to complete the relevant river-
basin project.  In the case of Atlanta, the public partner responsibility included flushing of 
the wastewater system which the private operator claimed was not performed as planned 
preventing them from meeting the environmental criteria.  The City of Atlanta denied the 
accusation yet the city auditor confirmed that the city had indeed failed to reinvest 
savings in its utility by charging its water department an annual franchise fee, the city had 
transferred US$9.8 million a year to its general fund (Reinhardt, 2003). A study 
conducted by the World Bank (2009) advises that the experience in Africa evolved to 
forming the so-called Public Assets-Holding Companies (AHCs) to act as owner of the 
water supply assets.  However, the delay in implementing extension programs by AHCs 
have, in some cases, caused major problems to the operator.  In Guinea, the AHC’s delays 
in implementing extension programs frustrated the operator, and was encouraged to seek 
financing for implementing its own projects with adversely impacted the operational 
performance. In Senegal, initial delays in implementing rehabilitation programs meant 
that the AHC had to compensate the operator for loss of revenues.  
 
Project affected by others’ underperforming facilities: In Halifax, the contract was set 
so that the city controls what goes into its sewer system. The city enforced a sewer-use 
bylaw to prevent hard-to-treat industrial pollutants from contaminating the influent but 
the city’s regulation of discharges from some 5,000 sources will only be as effective as 
the monitoring and enforcement behind it with no clear identification in the contract. The 
latest information on the quality of influent quality was due to the inability to control over 
5000 sources, which does not form part of the Contractor’s scope of work. 
 
E. Commercial and Law 
Unsuitable Commercial Model: A suitable commercial model is essential for the 
successful delivery of the PPP project.  Experience shows that the transfer of significant 
financing responsibilities to the private partners may create problems.  This was obvious 
in the case of Cochabamba, Bolivia.  The private investor - quickly after award - 
increased supplied water by 30 percent, simply through repairs and technical 
enhancements. However, the concession included operation of the existing water supply 
system and construction within two years of the US $214 million Misicuni Multipurpose 
Project (MMP), which used the River Misicuni for electricity generation, irrigation and 
water supply to the city. In order to meet these requirements, an average tariff 
increase of 35% was agreed upon during contractual negotiations.  The government 
committee that negotiated the contract did not appreciate the financial implications when 
it insisted on the construction of the Misicuni dam, a project that was not deemed 
financially viable by the World Bank and international water companies. The government 
also insisted that the private sector sign and execute a contract for construction of a 
treatment plant that the consortium thought expensive and unnecessary (UNDP, 2012). In 
developing countries, the risk is more pronounced, as noticed in failed PPPs in Gambia 
and Chad, where the design of the capital budget was ill-matched with the PPP objectives 
(World Bank Group, 2009). In the case of Gambia’s joint power/water operation, 85 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE “WATER-SPECIFIC P3 RISK MODEL”,  
RISKS IDENTIFIED 
 
9 
 
percent of the revenues were generated from the sale of electricity, but no financing was 
available for rehabilitating and extending the power production and distribution 
infrastructure, in particular to replace a generator that collapsed the day before the 
operator mobilized (World Bank Group, 2009). 
 
Skewed Tariff Structure: This may have significant implications on the satisfaction of 
stakeholders and in turn the overall delivery of the project. In the case of Cochabamba, 
Bolivia, an “Increasing Block Tariff (IBT)” was issued to ensure that high-income 
households would pay around twice the amount per cubic meter for consumption above 
12 m
3
 that low-income users would pay. While the average tariff increase was 35 
percent, the actual increase varied; lower-income consumers for increases of as little as 
10 percent while higher-income consumers experienced tariff increases as high as 106 
percent due to the increased tariff for their high level of consumption (UNDP, 2012). 
 
Billing: In Africa, billing to public agencies represents 15 to 25 percent of the total 
billing.  Water bills owed by public agencies have been a constant source of conflict 
between private operators and governments. In Côte d’Ivoire, this has been a recurrent 
problem, solved only temporarily by the sector adjustment in the late 1980s. Some 
countries have introduced special arrangements to mitigate the associated financial risk to 
water utilities and protect the revenues. In some countries like Senegal and Niger, an 
upgrade of the internal plumbing of public buildings to limit water consumption has been 
introduced.  However, the improvement in billing administration has got several faces.  It 
may lead to a reduction in consumption as a result of water rationing. However, in some 
cases, the opposite may occur, when the greater availability of water lead many 
consumers to increase their consumption, which creates an increased water bills not 
only because of an increase in price but also because of an increase in volume.  
 
Exchange Rate and Fixed Assets: Water Projects include considerable fixed assets that 
are considered irreversible. It is therefore prudent to ensure the commercial scheme has 
reduced the exposure to the risk of increase in exchange rates.  Even in PPP where the 
investment program is financed by the partner government, the operator must still finance 
operating expenses to cover the expatriate staff and imported inputs (chemicals, spare 
parts, hardware, and software).  These costs are in foreign currency, while the operator’s 
revenues are in local currency only.  Financial problems plagued privatization in Buenos 
Aires, where a private investor won a 30-year water and wastewater concession in 1993. 
The private investor increased water coverage, billing collection, operating efficiency. 
Although it initially promised to reduce tariffs by almost 27 percent, over the years it 
obtained a number of price adjustments, the first because of the city’s inadequate records 
and the unexpectedly poor condition of the water distribution network. However, the 
Argentine financial crisis of early 2002 wreaked havoc on the concession. The peso was 
“de-pegged” from the dollar and devalued, the private investor had trouble servicing its 
debt, most of which was denominated in U.S. dollars. When the government refused to 
raise prices to offset the devaluation, the consortium announced its desire to pull out of 
the agreement, and the matter went into arbitration (Brubaker 2003). Guaranteed foreign 
exchange rate is typical where the foreign exchange risk is limited as the exchange rate to 
the Euro (or USD) is fixed, and the difference between inflation rates can easily be taken 
care of through cost index formula.  A study by the World Bank (2009) of seven African 
countries in the sample of PPP showed Cape Verde, Ghana, and Guinea—countries with 
floating local currencies—have faced a higher foreign exchange risk.  
 
Exclusive Right to Water Resources: To make the project financially viable in the case 
of Cochabamba, Bolivia, the private sector was granted the exclusive right of water 
resources in Cochabamba as well as any future sources required for the supply of water 
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to the consumers in the city.  As a consequence, many private wells were shut down.  
This decision carried significant negative political implications (UNDP, 2012).  
 
F. Stakeholder Management 
Poor Involvement of Stakeholders: Considering the use of PPPs for water supply 
services always leads to an emotional debate. Consulting local stakeholders helps to 
clarify the objectives of PPPs.  At the design stage, several of the PPPs documents have 
paid particular attention to consulting with stakeholders, including various government 
departments, management and staff of the public utility, and the media.   Typical fears 
include steep tariff increases, massive staff reduction, heavy foreign presence, or 
exclusion of the poor. Expanding the customer base has often been a key factor for 
contracts to achieve financial sustainability.  In Cochabamba, it was concluded that public 
officials should have better informed the public about the size and rationale for the tariff 
increase. Only after three months into the operations, significant public opposition 
emerged.  A series of protests against the contract and the increase in water tariffs took 
place. Within weeks, public demonstrations prompted the government to roll back the 
rates and force a refund of the difference paid. The protests continued and escalated to 
the point that the military was sent into Cochabamba to restore calm. In the deteriorating 
situation, the working personnel abandoned their offices and the government cancelled 
the contract (UNDP, 2012).  
 
Public Sector Involvement: The operator should be closely associated with defining and 
implementing the rehabilitation and extension of distribution networks and with 
rehabilitating key plants. Experience shows that even for PPP with public funding for 
investment, operators should play a role in implementing civil works.  The involvement 
of local private operators managed by nationals typically helps in dissipating the 
perception of foreign involvement in a socially sensitive sector and increases the 
acceptability of PPPs. This was witnessed in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal.  At the opposite 
extreme, the perception of foreign-managed operator was strong in Gambia, Chad, and 
Mali and was one reason that that led to termination of the contracts (World Bank, 2009).  
In Côte d’Ivoire, the asset capital became public in 1978 and rapidly became one of the 
largest companies quoted at the Abidjan stock exchange. It is owned by hundreds of local 
shareholders and the company’s own staff has been crucial in establishing a sustainable 
partnership between an African government and an African private operator. Shares of 
the private operators in Senegal, Niger, and Gabon are also held by local partners and by 
staff. Guinea’s failure to foster local private management at SEEG was largely due to the 
structure of the company’s ownership, with a 49 percent minority share held by the 
government. 
 
Poor Selection of Local Partner:  In Chad, the PPP ran into early trouble partly because 
financing for a new power plant had not been secured on time and the construction 
contracts that were awarded to inexperienced contractors for a 350 km pipeline and power 
plant had to be terminated for poor performance  (World Bank, 2009). 
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CONCLUSION 
In the light of the above discussion, the main risks factors associated with water PPP 
projects are summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Water-Specific P3 Risks 
Group Description 
A: Difficulties in 
Obtaining/Verifying Existing 
Facility Records 
A1: Absence of maintenance records 
A2: Absence of environmental data sampling records 
B: Difficulties in Verifying the 
Asset Condition 
B1: Uncertainty of value of assets 
B2: Uncertainty of cost of maintenance 
C: Need for Unsustainable 
Expansion of Facility/Utilities 
C1: Potential increase in served population 
C2: Potential increase in usage 
C3: Increase in resources to meet environmental guidelines 
D: Adverse Impact from 
Interdependent Facilities 
D1: Improper planning of interrelated projects 
D2: Uncontrolled performance of interrelated projects 
E: Enforcement of New 
Commercial and/or Legal 
Regulations 
 
E1: Overly complicated commercial model 
E2: Potential excessive increase in tariff structure 
E3: Enforcement of right to water resources 
E4: Significant change in current billing practice 
E5: Potential change in currency exchange rates 
F: Mismanagement of 
Stakeholders 
 
F1: Poor communication with stakeholders 
F2: Potential disruption to current local businesses 
F3: Underperformance of a local partner 
 
SUMMARY 
In the early 1990s, market-driven approaches for water resources management started to 
gain acceptance.  Water was recognized as an economic good.  Privatization and 
decentralization have become the main reform policies of the major international 
organizations (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development).  Public-Private Partnerships (abbreviated as PPP, or P3) 
have been introduced as the most common scheme of project development. The 
involvement of the private sector in water infrastructure projects is a subject of much 
debate, which is currently far from being settled.  Statistically, water projects undertaken 
under private sector are experiencing cancellation/distress at a much higher rate than 
other infrastructure projects under the same procurement scheme.  Both proponents and 
opponents of water privatization support their claims with figures that should strengthen 
each party’s argument. However, in lack of a common base of comparative analysis, 
these numbers were not indicative and could be considered as outliers.   
 
A research on Water PPP is not expected to conclude on the debate on this matter.  
However, a better understanding of the risks involved in water PPP projects can 
significantly assist in designing containment measures to deal with their likely impact on 
the projects.  As such, a research plan was set to develop the “Water-Specific P3 Risk 
Model” which offers a platform to incorporate tangible and intangible risk variables into a 
risk assessment process in water infrastructure projects.   
 
This paper presented the literature review undertaken for the identification of the risk 
factors associated with water PPP projects.  As a primary stage, a critical review was 
undertaken for the arguments raised by both sides of the debate on water PPP.  The 
review showed that most arguments are driven by ideological pre-set opinions that led to 
making invalid assumptions, exaggerated claims, omission of facts, or was found 
contradictory in some cases.  Subsequently, the author conducted an extensive review of 
water PPP projects cancellation including studying several published material and case 
studies.  This paper presents the outcome of the literature review process where a 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE “WATER-SPECIFIC P3 RISK MODEL”,  
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summary of identified risks is presented in conclusion.  The subsequent research stage 
will seek the industry experts to evaluate the identified risks through a questionnaire 
survey, where the outcome of the survey will be analyzed using the Analytic Network 
Process (ANP) to demonstrate the complex interactions among those risks.  The “Water-
Specific P3 Risk Model” resulting from this research remains limited to the cases in hand 
and the opinions of the experts who contributed to this research.  However, the proposed 
model offers an opportunity for future research to build on what has been achieved. 
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